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Accounting for Mandatory Payroll
Deductions in Calculating AFDC Grants
In 1981 Congress adopted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981 (OBRA),1 a series of budget-cutting measures aimed at
reducing the growth of government spending.2 OBRA extensively
amended the methods used in calculating eligibility and benefits
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
gram.3 Among the changes adopted was the imposition of a sev-
enty-five dollar limit on the amount of work-related expenses de-
ductible from the income of working AFDC recipients before their
grants are calculated.4 Prior to OBRA, all reasonable work ex-
penses, 5 such as the costs of transportation,' uniforms, and child
care,8 were deductible, and the allowable deduction for such ex-
penses had come to be known as the "work expense disregard." 9
The OBRA-imposed limit on the work expense disregard has
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.
2 See S. REP. No. 137, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 501-23 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT], reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 396; infra text accompanying note
66.
, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Congress adopted the AFDC program in
order to promote the care of needy dependents in their own homes or in those of relatives
and to assist those parents or relatives with whom they live to attain self-sufficiency. 42
U.S.C. § 601 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a general discussion of the administration of the
AFDC program, see infra note 16.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981). The work expense disregard is one of several
amounts deducted from a recipient's resources in calculating her AFDC grant. In general,
the purpose of the work expense disregard is to ensure that AFDC recipients have an incen-
tive to work. See infra text accompanying notes 20-21.
5 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976) (States shall "in determining need, take into considera-
tion ... any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income.").
4 See, e.g., James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 799 (3d Cir. 1983) (transportation costs
included in work expenses in Pennsylvania); Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir.
1983) (same in California), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
7 See, e.g., James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 799 (3d Cir. 1983) (uniform costs included
in work expenses in Pennsylvania); Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983)
(same in California), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
8 OBRA also limited the child care expense deduction to $160 per child per month. 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(iii) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
' The term "work expense disregard" refers to a particular category of a recipient's
resources-work expenses-that is excluded from consideration as income for purposes of
determining eligibility for AFDC grants based on the amount of income available to the
recipient and the amount of such a grant to which the recipient is entitled. James v.
O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 795 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983).
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given rise to a controversy over whether amounts mandatorily
withheld from working recipients' payroll checks to pay federal
and state taxes and Social Security contributions 0 are to be in-
cluded in calculating work expenses for purposes of applying the
limit. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has
interpreted the work expense disregard limit to include mandatory
payroll deductions.11 Nevertheless, the federal courts have dis-
agreed on the issue, with some squarely rejecting the HHS inter-
pretation as inconsistent with the Social Security Act.1 2 The Su-
preme Court has recently granted certiorari to consider the
question."3
This comment assesses the opposing views on the treatment of
mandatory payroll deductions in light of the legislative and admin-
istrative history of the statutory provisions for working AFDC re-
cipients. 14 The comment concludes that these provisions should be
10 This comment will use the term "mandatory payroll deductions" to refer to amounts
so withheld.
" See, e.g., Petition for Certiorari at 4, Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984),
granting cert. to Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983).
12 See, e.g., Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983); cert. granted sub nom. Heck-
ler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); Clark v. Helms, No. 83-9-D, slip op. (D.N.H. Dec. 9,
1983); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp.
687 (W.D. Wash. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-3725 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1983); Nishimoto v.
Sunn, 561 F. Supp. 692 (D. Hawaii 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-2214 (9th Cir. Apr. 4,
1983); RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). But see Dickenson v. Petit, No. 83-
1676, slip op. (1st Cir. Feb. 23, 1984); Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); James
v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794 (3rd Cir. 1983); Gaston v. Schweiker, No. 82-1337, slip op. (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 1, 1983).
13 Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984), granting cert. to Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d
1109 (9th Cir. 1983).
14 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides in relevant part-
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must...
(7) except as may be otherwise provided in paragraph (8)... of this title, provide
that the State agency-
(A) shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and
resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children
(8)
(A) ... [In making the determination under paragraph (7), the State
agency-
(ii) shall disregard from the earned income of any child or relative apply-
ing for or receiving aid to families with dependent children ... the first $75
of the total of such earned income for such month (or such lesser amount as
the Secretary may prescribe in the case of an individual not engaged in full-
time employment or not employed throughout the month);
(iv) shall disregard from the earned income of any child or relative re-
ceiving aid to families with dependent children... an amount equal to the
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construed to exclude mandatory payroll deductions from an AFDC
recipient's income and thereby also exclude them from the recipi-
ent's work expense disregard in calculating her grant. This con-
struction most effectively harmonizes the fundamental purposes of
the AFDC program with those of OBRA.
I. THE AFDC GRANT AND THE WORK INCENTIVE DISREGARDS
Under section 402(a)(7) of the Social Security Act,15 partici-
pating states16 are required to base a recipient family's AFDC
grant on its income and resources.1" This requirement makes a re-
cipient family's AFDC grant vary inversely with its income,
thereby creating a disincentive for a recipient to work. Yet one of
the chief purposes of the AFDC program is to help parents or
other custodial relatives of "needy dependent children . . . to at-
tain or retain capability for the maximum self support and per-
sonal independence." 8 Accordingly, a number of work incentive
provisions have been built into the program. For example, states
participating in the AFDC program are permitted to implement
"workfare" programs, under which benefits may be reduced for, or
denied to, recipients who refuse to seek employment.' In addition
first $30 of the total of such earned income not already disregarded under the
preceding provisions of this paragraph plus one-third of the remainder
thereof ... and
(B) provide that (with respect to any month) the State agency-
(ii)... (II) in the case of the earned income of a person with respect to
whom subparagraph (A)(iv) has been applied for four consecutive months,
shall not apply the provisions of subparagraph (A)(iv) for so long as he con-
tinues to receive aid under the plan and shall not apply such provisions to
any month thereafter until the expiration of an additional period of twelve
consecutive months during which period he is not a recipient of such aid.
15 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
16 The AFDC program is financed by both the states and the federal government on a
matching fund basis. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1976). Participating states must submit AFDC plans
in conformity with the Act to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The program is administered
primarily by the states, and, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, the states are
given broad discretion in determining the level of benefits. See Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S.
251, 253 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 541 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 478 (1970); Rosado v." Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1970); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968).
17 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1S 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This language was not altered by the 1981
OBRA amendments.
19 42 U.S.C. § 609 (1976). Before OBRA, AFDC recipients could not be denied benefits
if they refused to participate in the program. As of October 1, 1981, however, states can
deny benefits to AFDC recipients who refuse, without good cause, to accept "workfare" em-
ployment. See 42 U.S.C. § 609(c) (Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of the current workfare
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to the "workfare" option, Congress requires state AFDC programs
to disregard certain types of income in calculating the amount of a
recipient's grant. These work incentive disregards include the
earned income disregard, which allows working recipients to de-
duct a flat percentage of their income during the first four months
of employment,20 and the work expense disregard, which provides
that the first seventy-five dollars of a recipient family's monthly
income that is spent on work-related expenses shall be disregarded
in calculating the amount of the AFDC grant.21
The Social Security Act thus requires states to perform a
three-step calculation to determine the amount of a family's AFDC
benefits. First, under section 402(a)(7), the amount of the family's
income must be determined.22 Second, the family's adjusted in-
come must be determined by subtracting the work-incentive disre-
gards of section 402(a)(8) from the income determined in step
one.23 Third, the AFDC benefits must be calculated by comparing
the adjusted income found in step two to the standard of need es-
tablished by the recipient's state of residence.24
The central question with respect to mandatory payroll deduc-
tions is whether they figure in step one of the benefit calculation
by being excluded from income or whether they figure in step two
by being included in the work expense disregard subtracted from
income-that is, roughly speaking, whether they are to be de-
ducted from gross or net income. Unfortunately, the language of
the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act provides little
guidance for resolving this issue.
From the time of the original enactment of the Social Security
Act in 1935, state agencies have been obliged to consider any "in-
come and resources" of AFDC recipients in calculating grants
under that program.25 Yet the term "income" has never been de-
fined in the Act. One might construe "income" to mean available,
or net, income.26 This construction is supported by an HHS regula-
provision, see Comment, The 1981 AFDC Amendments: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 81, 95-104 (1982).
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(iv) (Supp. V 1981).
21 Id. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1981).
22 See id. § 602(a)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
23 See id. § 602(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981).
24 See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (1983). The "standard of need" is "the amount deemed neces-
sary by the State to maintain a hypothetical family at a subsistence level." Shea v. Vial-
pando, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974).
25 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 401(b), 53 Stat. 1360,
1379 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. V 1981)).
28 See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
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tion directing that, in determining an AFDC recipient's need, only
"[nlet income. . . and resources available for current use shall be
considered. 2 7 This regulation embodies the "availability" princi-
ple of welfare law, under which income or resources in which the
recipient has no legal interest or which are not available to her are
not considered in determining eligibility for benefits.2"
A second construction of the term "income" is also plausible.
Since 1968, section 402(a)(7), which provides that a recipient's in-
come must be considered in determining whether to award benefits
to her, has been prefaced by the language "except as may be other-
wise provided in paragraph 8. 129 Paragraph eight provides that the
work expense disregard be taken from "earned income."30 An HHS
regulation defines "earned income" as "the total amount [of in-
come], irrespective of personal expenses, such as income-tax de-
ductions. 3 1 HHS's current position is that the availability princi-
ple of section 402(a)(7) is subject to the "earned income" provision
of 402(a)(8), and HHS interprets "earned income" as referring to
gross income.32 This argument has convinced some courts to aban-
don the availability principle in adjudicating disputes over the in-
terpretation of section 402(a) (8).ss
The practical significance of the choice between these two con-
structions of "income" is apparent when one considers their re-
spective effects on the order of exclusionary calculations under sec-
tions 402(a)(7) and (8). Under both views, mandatory payroll
deductions are disregarded in calculating the income of AFDC re-
cipients, but under the net or available income construction,
mandatory payroll deductions are disregarded before-and sepa-
rately from-work expenses, while under the gross income con-
struction, mandatory payroll deductions are disregarded as work
expenses. The latter construction has the effect of reducing the size
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
27 45 C.F.R. §233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1983). "[I]ncome and resources are considered availa-
ble both when actually available and when the applicant or recipient has a legal interest in a
liquidated sum and has the legal ability to make such sum available for support and mainte-
nance." Id.
28 See, e.g., Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552
(1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); infra note 90. The applicability of the availabil-
ity principle to mandatory payroll deductions is discussed infra text accompanying notes
88-99.
21 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
30 Id. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
31 45 C.F.R. §233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1983).
32 See Petition for Certiorari at 10, Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
32 See, e.g., Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d
794 (3d Cir. 1983).
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of grant amounts for a working AFDC recipient where the total of
her other work expenses and payroll deductions exceeds seventy-
five dollars since including mandatory payroll deductions in the
seventy-five dollars work expense allowance results in denying the
disregard to work expenses actually incurred on items such as
transportation and uniforms.3 4
II. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
The legislative and administrative history of the work expense
disregard divides naturally into three stages: from 1935, when the
AFDC program was enacted, 5 to 1962, when the work expense dis-
regard was first added to the statute;36 from 1962 to 1981, the years
between the enactment of the work expense disregard and the
adoption of the OBRA amendments;3 7 and since 1981, the year in
which Congress imposed the limitation on the work expense
disregard.
A. 1935 to 1962
The Social Security Act of 1935 did not expressly require that
states consider a family's income when calculating its AFDC
34 The effect of allowing mandatory payroll deductions to figure in the calculation of
available income rather than in the calculation of the work expense disregard may be illus-
trated by the following example discussed in Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). In 1982, a Califor-
nia mother with three children who earned the minimum wage ($3.25 an hour) would have
made $576.20 per month and had $59.52 withheld from her paycheck for federal and state
income taxes, FICA, and state disability insurance. If the grant were calculated from net
income, she would still have $75 available to cover her work-related expenses for transporta-
tion, uniforms, union dues, etc., leaving her with $441 after deductions and disregards. As-
suming a state benefit level of $601, the $441 would be subtracted from that amount, giving
her a monthly AFDC grant of $160. If the calculation is made from gross income, the
mandatory payroll deductions would make up 80% of her work-related expense allowance of
$75. She would be left with an amount after disregards of $501, which, when subtracted
from the $601 benefit level, leaves $100 in grant money, $60 less than if the grant were
calculated from net income. The $60 grant reduction decreases the family's monthly AFDC
grant by approximately 38% and reduces the amount of money available each month by
approximately 10%. HHS has estimated that calculating AFDC grants by treating
mandatory payroll deductions as included in the work expense disregard would increase
grants to working AFDC recipients by approximately $57 million annually. See Petition for
Certiorari at 10 n.4, Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
s1 Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 401-06, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-76 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
.. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 172, 188
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(8) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
37 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §2301, 95 Stat. 357,
843-44 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981)).
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grant.3 8 Therefore, states were able to disburse AFDC grants with-
out regard to a recipient's outside income. In 1939 Congress recti-
fied this omission by adding what is now section 402(a)(7) to the
Act. s3
The Congress that enacted section 402(a)(7) did not indicate
whether it intended to exclude mandatory payroll deductions from
the income and resources of AFDC recipients to be "take[n] into
consideration" under section 402(a)(7). This omission is not sur-
prising, for in 1939 mandatory payroll deductions were withheld
only for Social Security contributions, 40 and not for federal4' or
state42 taxes. Yet Social Security officials and individual congress-
men expressed concern that state agencies not include as "income"
money not actually available to AFDC recipients. 3 In 1940, the
Social Security Board 44 issued a policy statement interpreting sec-
tion 402(a)(7) as requiring consideration only of income that "actu-
ally exists [and is] . . . available to the applicant. 415 The policy
statement defined "available" as meaning "actually on hand or
' Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 402, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29.
" Social Security Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 402(b), 53 Stat. 1360,
1379-80 ("[T]he State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other
income and resources of any child claiming aid to dependent children .... ") (amending
Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 402), 49 Stat. 620, 627-28 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976)) (amended 1981).
" Mandatory payroll deductions of FICA (social security) taxes began in 1935 with the
passage of the Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 802(a), 49 Stat. 620, 636.
41 The practice of withholding amounts from paychecks for federal income tax purposes
was first required in 1943. See Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-68, ch.
120, 57 Stat. 126.
42 See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 639 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
43 See, e.g., Hearings Relative to the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2254 (1939) ("[We] do
require that the States take into account, in determining need, any contributions that rela-
tives actually make . . . ." (emphasis added)) (statement of Arthur Altmeyer, Chairman,
Social Security Board); cf. 84 CONG. REc. 6851 (1939) (remarks of Rep. Poage) (expressing
concern that the new income provision not be used to "deny some needy. person the aid
to which he is entitled.").
44 As the Court noted in RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 639 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the
AFDC program has been administered by four federal agencies during its 48-year history.
From 1935 until 1946 it was managed by the Social Security Board. The Federal Security
Agency administered the program from 1946 until 1953. See Reorganization Plan No. 2 of
1946, 60 Stat. 1095. In 1953 the newly created Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare took over the program's administration. See Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953, 67 Stat.
631. In 1979 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was replaced by the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. See Department of Education Organization Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-88, § 509, 93 Stat. 668, 695 (1979).
46 RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 639 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting Social Security
Board, Policy Statement 2 (Dec. 2, 1940)).
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ready for use when ... needed.'4' Two years later, the policy
statement was incorporated into the Board's Guide to Public As-
sistance Administration.7
Although the 1939 amendments did not require disregard of
work expenses, the states were permitted to disregard them if they
chose.4 1 The 1957 edition of the Handbook of Public Assistance
issued by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) included a list of items that state agencies might disregard,
including amounts paid for food, clothing, and personal incidentals
but not mandatory payroll deductions. 9 Given the monetary sig-
nificance of mandatory payroll deductions in 1957,50 it is unlikely
that HEW's failure to categorize them as work expenses was inad-
vertent. Rather, inclusion of mandatory payroll deductions as a
work expense was unnecessary, since the administrative practice
before 1962 had been to use net income as the basis for calculating
AFDC grants.51 A 1961 HEW report noted that forty-eight states
published lists of items considered "deductible employment
costs. ' 52 Although none of these lists included taxes,53 it was re-
46 Id.
' RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 640 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[I]ncome when consid-
ered ... should be real and not fictitious... [and] should be actually on hand or ready for
use when it is needed.") (quoting SoCIAL SECURITY BOARD, GUIDE TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AD-
MINISTRATION § 202, at 2 (1942)).
48 See HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION (pt. 4), § 3140 (1957).
49 A State public assistance agency may establish a reasonable minimum money
amount to represent the combined additional cost of three items-food, clothing, and
personal incidentals-for all employed persons. The State plan may provide that other
items of work expense will be allowed when there is a determination that such expenses
do, in fact, exist in the individual case.
Id., quoted in RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
"o By 1957 employers were required to withhold money from employee paychecks for
federal income taxes, see supra note 41. Since the advent of general tax withholding,
mandatory payroll deductions are frequently nearly as great as the total of all the expenses
enumerated in the HEW list:
For most families with an employed member, mandatory payroll deductions would ap-
parently entail more money than any item listed in section 3140 [HEW, supra note 48,
at § 3140]. Indeed, the figures available to the Court indicate that mandatory payroll
deductions may often be nearly equal in amount to the total of all section 3140 employ-
ment expenses combined. It is unimaginable that so significant an item would have
been left out of section 3140 if, as defendants contend, mandatory payroll deductions
were being treated as "employment expenses."
RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
51 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
52 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION BUREAU OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, STATE METHODS FOR
DETERMINING NEED IN THE AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM 25 (HEW Public Assis-
tance Report No. 43, 1961).
"3 Id. The items listed included transportation (38 states), special tools and equipment
(23 states), uniforms and/or other special clothing (22 states), cost of child care (21 states),
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ported that the states almost uniformly calculated the AFDC grant
from "take-home pay," or net income. 4
B. 1962 to 1981
In 1962, Congress, for the purpose of creating a work incen-
tive, 55 made mandatory the "widespread but then optional prac-
tice" 6 of excluding work expenses from the calculation of AFDC
grants.57 The legislative history of the 1962 amendment made no
mention of mandatory payroll deductions as work expenses.88 The
Handbook of Public Assistance, amended by HEW in 1963, again
omitted mandatory payroll deductions from its enumeration of
work expenses.5 9
In 1974 the Supreme Court, in Shea v. Vialpando,0 held that
under section 402(a)(7), which at that time required that "all ex-
penses reasonably attributable" to employment be disregarded
from the recipient's income in calculating the recipient's AFDC
grant,61 a state agency could not adopt a standardized maximum
allowance for work expenses. For most state programs that, like
lunches (15 states), and collection for employee benefits (7 states).
64 Id. According to the Report, "The term 'gross income,' as used by the States in these
policies, refers to 'take-home pay' after payroll deductions for union dues, income tax, re-
tirement, and other such items have been made. 'Net income' refers to amounts available
after other employment costs have been recognised." Id.
51 As HEW Secretary Ribicoff testified during the Hearings on the 1962 amendment:
What we are trying to do ... is do everything we can to encourage the States. By
having this provision, the State will take into account these expenses so people will get
jobs. I believe that the State should give them an allowance for those items that are
necessary for them to get a job.
Hearings on the Public Assistance Act of 1962 Before the Senate Committee on Finance,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1962); see S. REP. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1962),
reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1943, 1960 ("[I]f these work expenses are
not considered in determining need, they have the effect of providing a disincentive to work-
ing. . . . "); H.R. REP. No. 1414, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1962).
" Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 260 (1974).
57 "[T]he State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other
income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent chil-
dren, as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income
. . . ." Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 106, 76 Stat. 172, 188
(1962) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976)).
88 See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
59 The 1963 Handbook retained the listing of "food, clothing and personal incidentals"
from the 1957 Handbook, see HEW, supra note 48, at § 3140, but added a more detailed list
of items including uniforms, transportation, collections for employee benefits, tools, licenses,
union or other dues, education, publications, child care, and protective clothing. HEW,
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC AssIsTANcE ADMINISTRATION (pt. 4), § 3140 (1963).
60 416 U.S. 251 (1974).
" See id. at 254.
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the Colorado program rejected in Shea,62 had standardized al-
lowances, the imposition of the standard allowance had had no ef-
fect on mandatory payroll deductions, which were separately de-
ductible."3 The Court in Shea did not explicitly decide whether
mandatory payroll deductions were to be included in the work ex-
pense disregard. The Court simply required the states to disregard
fully "any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of in-
come." '64 Such expenses included both mandatory payroll deduc-
tions and work expenses. It was only after Shea that state agencies
began to list mandatory payroll deductions as "work expenses" on
the forms used in calculating AFDC grants.6 5 This may have been
due to administrative convenience, for under the Shea holding it
made no practical difference how mandatory payroll deductions
were classified. Whether classified as unavailable and therefore not
income, or as work expenses, and therefore deductible, mandatory
payroll deductions would be excluded from the income base used
for calculating AFDC grants.
C. 1981: The OBRA Amendments
In 1981 Congress enacted the OBRA budget cuts in order to
"wage an effective battle against [the] high inflation and unem-
ployment which have plagued the national economy for many
years.""6 In addition to this general purpose, the legislative history
reveals that Congress had three specific reasons for imposing the
seventy-five dollar limit on the work expense disregard: to reduce
variation among the states in the amount allowed for the work ex-
pense disregard;6 7 to prevent abuse by AFDC recipients who might
2 See id. at 255. The Colorado work expense regulation is found at 4 COLORADO Dv-
SION OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STAFF MANUAL § 4313.13 (1970).
"' In February 1972, fifteen states used a standardized deduction for work expenses
other than child care. Twelve of these fifteen states required that mandatory payroll deduc-
tions be itemized separately from and in addition to the state's standard work expense dis-
regard. RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp 634, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
"416 U.S. at 254.
15 RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see James v. 0' Bannon, 715
F.2d 794, 807 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that withheld taxes and work expenses were not viewed
as "conceptually distinct").
66 SENATE REPORT supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
396, 398.
67 States are free to define which expenses they consider "reasonably attributable" and
State policies vary. Some states provide no disregard for child care expenses, paying for
care instead through the Title XX social services program. Some states put limits on
the amounts they will allow for child care. Many States have limits on amounts they
will allow for such items as lunches, transportation, or uniforms.
Id. at 501, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 396, 767.
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otherwise report excessive work expenses;68 and to reduce adminis-
trativt complexity and error by providing for a standardized de-
duction rather than itemized work expenses.8 9
Nowhere in the legislative history of OBRA is there a specific
discussion of the proper treatment of mandatory payroll deduc-
tions. OBRA itself makes no mention of payroll deductions in par-
ticular, though it does move the work expense disregard from sec-
tion 402(a)(7), the section providing for the calculation of available
income, 7 to section 402(a)(8), the section which now provides for
the deduction of earned income, child care, and work expense dis-
regards from the income computed under section 402(a)(7). 1
Nonetheless, HHS has taken the position that the work expense
disregard is now to be taken from gross income, and therefore in-
cludes mandatory payroll deductions. 2
III. ANALYSIS
As the Supreme Court has observed, the AFDC program is an
area in which Congress has at times "voiced its wishes in muted
strains and left it to the courts to discern the theme in the ca-
caphony of political understanding. '7 3 Such is the case with the
application of the seventy-five dollar limit on work-related ex-
penses to mandatory payroll deductions. The issue cannot be re-
solved by resort merely to the language of sections 402(a)(7) and
(8) of the Social Security Act. Under such circumstances, courts
are frequently inclined to defer to administrative interpretation of
the statute at issue. 4 Yet, while an agency's interpretation with a
"reasonable basis in law" is entitled to judicial deference,7 5 a court
may not properly defer to an administrative interpretation that is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the statute or regulation be-
ing interpreted.7 6 Under this standard, HHS's construction of the
" See id.; 127 CONG. REC. S1901-02 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1981) (statement of Sen. Inouye).
69 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 501-02, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 396, 768.
70 See supra text accompanying note 22.
71 See supra text accompanying note 23.
72 Petition for Certiorari, Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
7' Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 412 (1970).
74 See Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30 &
n.176 (1983).
75 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944); see United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1979).
7' See Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 262 n.11 (1974) (rejecting HEW's construction
of § 402(a)(7)); see also Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971) (rejecting HEW's
construction of § 402(a)(10) as inconsistent with the Act); Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Sec-
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work expense disregard provision as including mandatory payroll
deductions should be rejected. The agency interpretation rests on a
regulation that has been rendered obsolete by the OBRA amend-
ment of section 402(a)(8), and it is inconsistent with the funda-
mental availability principle of the Social Security Act, the work
incentive policy underlying the AFDC program, and longstanding
administrative practice. The alternative-to subtract mandatory
payroll deductions from the income calculated under section
402(a)(7) because they represent income that is unavailable to the
recipient 77-is more consistent with the policies of the Social Se-
curity Act and the purposes of the OBRA amendment of the work
expense disregard.
A. Obsolete Administrative Definition of "Earned Income"
HHS's argument that mandatory payroll deductions should be
included within the seventy-five dollar work expense disregard
rests upon an HHS regulation defining the term "earned income"
in section 402(a)(8) as gross income.7s This regulation has, how-
ever, been rendered obsolete by the OBRA amendment of section
402(a)(8).
The regulation defining "earned income" was promulgated in
1969.71 As the regulation was initially proposed in 1968, "earned
income" was defined as net income for the purpose of the earned
income disregard. s0 After receiving comments, HEW changed the
regulation so that the earned income disregard would be calculated
from gross incomeA1 Because the earned income disregard is com-
posed partly of a percentage of earned income,8 2 using gross in-
come as the base-line had the effect of increasing the amount of
the disregard and therefore of the AFDC grant. The change in def-
inition of "earned income" to one calculated from gross income ap-
pears to have been motivated by a recognition of the congressional
intent "to maximize the employment incentive to recipient fami-
retary of Labor, 649 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 1981) (interpretation must be consistent with
enabling act under which it was promulgated); Miller v. Bond, 641 F.2d 997, 1002 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Foulkes v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 1105, 1110 n.17 (7th Cir. 1981); Ruangswang v.
INS, 591 F.2d 39, 43 (9th Cir. 1978).
7 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
78 See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1983); supra text accompanying note 32.
79 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1983); see supra text accompanying note 31.
" See 33 Fed. Reg. 10230 (1968) (proposed July 17, 1968).
'1 See 34 Fed. Reg. 1394 (1969).
'2 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(iv) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a brief discussion of the
earned income disregard, see supra text accompanying note 20.
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lies."8 3 The Second Circuit relied upon this explanation to uphold
the HEW definition of "earned income" in 1971.84
The principal rationale for the HHS definition of "earned in-
come" as gross income-that it would maximize work incentives to
AFDC recipients by increasing the size of their earned income dis-
regard-did not survive the OBRA amendment of section
402(a)(8), which reordered the procedure for calculating grants so
that the earned income disregard is now calculated as a percentage
of the recipient's income after the child care and work expense dis-
regards have been subtracted. 5 The provision that the earned in-
come disregard be calculated on an amount less than gross income
defeats the original purpose of defining "earned income" as gross
income: increasing the amount of earned income disregard so as to
increase the recipient's incentive to work. Application of this regu-
lation to the work expense disregard is at odds with the original
purpose of both the regulation and the work expense disregard it-
self for the same reason:8 6 it would vitiate the work incentive effect
of the disregard by reducing its amount.8 7
B. Inconsistency of the HHS Interpretation of Section 402(a)(8)
with the Social Security Act
1. The Availability Principle. The applicability to section
402(a)(7) of the availability principle-that income and resources
not actually available for current use to welfare recipients should
not be considered in calculating benefits8a-has long-standing ad-
ministrative" and judicial 0 recognition.
63RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 648 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
84 See Connecticut State Dept. of Welfare v. HEW, 448 F.2d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 1971)
("The Secretary's formula ... provides recipients with greater incentives for engaging in
gainful employment.").
85 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(iv) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). OBRA also limited the
earned income disregard to the recipients first four months of continuous employment. Id.
OBRA's limitation of the earned income disregard was motivated by a perception that it
was an ineffective work incentive. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 502, reprinted in
1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 396, 738. For a general discussion of the effect of OBRA
on the earned income disregard, see Comment, supra note 19, at 85-92.$6 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
87See supra text accompanying note 34; infra text accompanying notes 106-13.
18 See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1982); supra notes 25-28, 44-47 and accompany-
ing text.
89 See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
90 See, e.g., Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975) (invalidating a state statute that
created a presumption that a nonpaying lodger in the home of an AFDC recipient contrib-
uted to the support of the household); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) (invalidating a
state regulation requiring that the income of a stepfather who had not adopted the recipient
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In National Welfare Rights Organization v. Mathews,91 the
District of Columbia Circuit applied the availability principle to
hold that only the recipient's equity in an encumbered asset, and
not the asset's market value, could be considered a resource under
section 402(a)(7). Considering gross, rather than net, income as the
basis for calculating an AFDC recipient's benefits is like consider-
ing the full market value of an encumbered asset as a resource of
its owner. An AFDC recipient may earn her gross income, just as
she may hold legal title to an encumbered asset. However, amounts
withheld from earnings for federal or state taxes are no more avail-
able to meet the immediate needs of the wage-earner than is the
full market value of a property owner's encumbered asset.9 2
To cast aside the availability principle in calculating the work
expense disregard is inconsistent with longstanding agency practice
that has received overwhelming judicial approval,9 3 and this fact
alone might be reason enough to reject HHS's position on the is-
sue." But the inconsistency is particularly troubling in light of
Congress's amendments to section 402(a)(7) in 1962, 1967, and
1968, in the course of which Congress made no attempt to reject
either the availability principle or the administrative practice of
fully disregarding mandatory payroll deductions.9 Indeed, Ma-
thews is cited with approval in the legislative history of OBRA it-
mother's children be included in the income of the AFDC family); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1968) (invalidating a state "substitute father" rule denying AFDC benefits to the chil-
dren of unmarried mothers cohabitating with men).
91 533 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
92 One district court case may lend support to an argument that amounts withheld
from paychecks for taxes are available to AFDC recipients. In Powell v. Austin, 427 F. Supp.
749 (E.D. Va. 1977), the court held that an AFDC recipient's garnished wages could be
treated as "income" in the calculation of benefits. Id. at 751. The court ruled that garnished
wages are available because "they provide actual, not assumed, benefits to the recipients, in
the form of extinguishing part of an outstanding debt." Id. Withheld taxes might be analo-
gized to garnished wages since they also extinguish an outstanding liability.
The holding in Powell, however, is fundamentally at odds with the availability principle
and should therefore not be extended. Garnished wages are not "actually on hand" to meet
the recipient's immediate needs. See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 639 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (quoting SocI, S.cueRrv BOARD, supra note 47, at 27). Even if Powell is correctly
decided, mandatory payroll deductions are distinguishable from garnished wages. A personal
debt is one voluntarily incurred in order to obtain benefits chosen by the debtor. The wages
burdened by the debt, unlike the withheld taxes, were once available to the wage-earner.
,' See supra note 90.
See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974) (deference afforded to an agency inter-
pretation depends on its consistency with previous agency interpretations); cf. EEOC v. As-
sociated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981) ("[A] contemporaneous construc-
tion deserves special deference when it has remained consistent over a long period of
time.").
95 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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self,96 thereby giving the availability principle and the practice of
fully disregarding mandatory payroll deductions tacit congressional
approval.9 7 In this sense, the argument that gross income is the
base-line for the work expense disregard is inconsistent with the
Social Security Act.
Courts rejecting the application of the availability principle to
mandatory payroll deductions distinguish availability cases on the
ground that they merely stand for the proposition that "the states
cannot presume or assume the existence of resources or income
sources."98 This distinction is meritless. From the perspective of
the availability principle, which considers what is "on hand or
ready for use when it is needed,"9 9 there is no meaningful differ-
ence between available income sources and the available income
itself.
2. Work Incentives. In enacting OBRA, Congress sought to re-
duce welfare spending.100 This goal was achieved in part by placing
limitations on the earned income,101 child expense,02 and work ex-
pense disregards.1 08 While these changes may embody a trend to-
ward decreased reliance on the work incentive approach to welfare
policy, they do not signify abandonment of that approach. OBRA's
retention of the section 402(a)(8) disregards attests to Congress's
enduring concern that welfare recipients be provided with work in-
centives. The fundamental purpose of assisting needy families to
attain self-sufficiency remains embedded in the AFDC statute.'10
Without the section 402(a)(8) disregards, AFDC recipients
would lack any monetary incentive to work. The amount that the
"1 "States were formerly allowed to value resources on the basis of fair market value.
However, as a result of a circuit court decision in NWRO v. Mathews, the regulations
were changed to require that all resources be valued on the basis of fair market value
less encumbrances, or equity value."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 503, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEws 396,
769.
" See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983), cert..granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
9 Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. 1100, 1116 n.13 (D. Me. 1982), a/i'd, No. 38-1696,
slip op. (1st Cir. Feb. 23, 1984). See James v. O'Bannon, 557 F. Supp. 631, 640 (E.D. Pa.
1982), aff'd, 715 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1983).
" See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 639 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting SocIAL SE-
cuRrrY BOARD, supra note 47, at 2).
100 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & A.
NEws 396, 398; supra note 66 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
,0, See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
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welfare check is reduced for every dollar earned is equivalent to a
tax on earnings.105 Thus, if an AFDC recipient earns $1000 and her
benefits are reduced by $300, it is as if a 30% tax had been im-
posed on her earnings. As the effective tax rate increases to 100%,
the recipient's incentive to work is reduced.
Under the current system of welfare disregards, the effective
"welfare tax rate"106 of a working AFDC recipient, after the four
months during which the earned income disregard operates have
elapsed,10 7 is at least 100%, even if mandatory payroll deductions
are excluded from her income separately from work expenses. Ex-
cluding mandatory deductions and disregarding the work and
child-care expenses only compensates the recipient for expenses
she would not incur if she did not work. Even if these disregards
did fully compensate the recipient for her work and child-care ex-
penses, her welfare benefits would be reduced one dollar for every
dollar of earned income, the equivalent of a tax rate of 100% .108 If
the recipient's actual work expenses exceed the statutory limita-
tion, her welfare tax rate will exceed 100%. Unless her salary so far
exceeds the state standard of need that she is ineligible for and is
no longer in actual need of welfare benefits, she is actually penal-
ized for working. Including mandatory payroll deductions within
the $75 work expense disregard can only exacerbate this penalty
and its work-disincentive effect.
The effect of including mandatory payroll deductions in the
work expense disregard is readily demonstrable. In California, for
example, the actual work expenses of AFDC recipients average $80
per month,0 ' $5 more than the statutory limit. The average AFDC
recipient is therefore already subject to a slight work disincentive
after her eligibility for the earned income disregard has expired. In
California, the average working AFDC recipient has $83 withheld
105 For a discussion of the disincentive effect of current welfare programs, see M. AN-
DERSON, WELFARE 87-132 (1978).
' See id. at 136-37.
107 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(8)(A)(iv) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
109 This example assumes that the total wages of the unemployed AFDC recipient is less
than the amount designated by the state as the "standard of need." Of course, if a recipi-
ent's total wages, reduced by work and child-care expenses, were greater than the state's
standard of need, she would have gained by working. But then she would qualify for no
AFDC benefits at all.
109 Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 614 (N.D. Cal. 1982). In Woods, the district
court based its findings on the state agency's 1980 statistics. Id. at 614 (quoting CALIFORNIA
STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, AFDC SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS FOR
FAMILIES RECEIVING Am DURING JULY 1980 table 18 (1982) (Program Series Information Re-
port 1982-01)).
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from her monthly wages for state and federal taxes. 110 If these were
included under the work expense disregard along with her actual
work expenses, she would receive a $75 credit to cover $163 in ex-
penses, and her family would be $88 poorer than if she had de-
cided not to work. The inclusion of mandatory payroll deductions
in the work expense disregard would actually fine California recipi-
ents for working."' In other states, where work expenses or
mandatory payroll deductions are lower," 2 the disincentive effect
is somewhat less marked,11 but in all states the inclusion of
mandatory payroll deductions in the work expense disregard se-
verely limits its work incentive effect." 4
As the Ninth Circuit noted, "the choice is between working
and not working. If the disincentive provided is strong enough,
there is no reason to believe that AFDC recipients will work in
order to pay handsomely for the privilege. 11 5 Although it is diffi-
cult to pinpoint exactly what welfare tax rate will prevent welfare
recipients from working," 6 treating mandatory payroll deductions
as work expenses so as to create a work disincentive is inconsistent
both with the AFDC program's purpose of encouraging recipients
110 Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 614 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
1 Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d at 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heck-
ler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). Because of the high cost of work-related expenses in
California, some working recipients would be penalized for working even if mandatory pay-
roll deductions were disregarded before work expenses. See, e.g., supra text accompanying
note 109. The disincentive to work is much less, however, than it would be if mandatory
payroll deductions were included in the work expense disregard.
H2 Turner v. Prod. 707 F.2d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler
v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
113 According to a recent study by the University of Chicago's Center for the Study of
Social Policy, under current HHS calculations, AFDC recipients in twelve states, including
California, lose money if they work. Those in another nine states earn less than ten dollars
in extra income for a full month of work. The disincentive effect of the current AFDC pro-
gram cannot be attributed solely to the inclusion of mandatory payroll deductions in the
work expense disregard; the limitation on the earned income disregard has also contributed
to the reduction in work incentives. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CwVI RIGHTS, A
GROWING CRISIS: DISADVANTAGED WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN 28-29 (1983).
1"4 See, e.g., RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (inclusion of
mandatory payroll deductions in the work expense disregard limits the work incentive for
New York AFDC recipients).
11 Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler
v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
"' [L]ow marginal tax rates, from zero to, say, 15 or 20 percent, seem to have a rela-
tively minimal effect on work effort; ... as tax rates move up into the region of 40, 50,
or even 60 percent, an increasing number of people are adversely affected; ... as tax
rates approach the confiscatory levels of 80, 90, or even 100 percent and more, the work
disincentive becomes very powerful.
Id. at 137.
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to become self-sufficient'1 7 and with the specific provision for work
incentives in section 402(a)(8)."1s Moreover, to the extent that in-
cluding mandatory payroll deductions in the work expense disre-
gard discourages AFDC recipients from taking steps to become
self-sufficient, it is inconsistent with OBRA's goal of reducing wel-
fare spending by the government."19
C. Effectuating the Purposes of Limiting the Work Expense
Disregard
Excluding mandatory payroll deductions from the work ex-
pense disregard, unlike the HHS regulation mandating their inclu-
sion, is consistent with basic aspects of the welfare system-the
availability principle and the creation of work incentives. Exclud-
ing mandatory payroll deductions from the work expense disregard
is also consistent with the congressional purposes for limiting the
disregard to seventy-five dollars, namely, reduction of variation
among the states in the work expense disregard, prevention of wel-
fare abuse, and administrative convenience. 20 The variance among
state tax rates creates a circumstance in which inclusion of
mandatory payroll deductions actually undermines the goal of
state-to-state uniformity.121 Furthermore, mandatory payroll de-
ductions do not provide opportunities for abuse by recipients or
occasion great inconveniences for AFDC administrators since they
are "paradigmatic examples of amounts that are not subject to be-
ing falsified and are not difficult for states to calculate."' 22 The net
income standard is therefore consistent both with the basic policies
of the AFDC program and with the purposes of the OBRA amend-
ment to the work expense disregard.
CONCLUSION
It is important not to lose sight of the purposes of the AFDC
program in the maze of statutes, court decisions, and regulations
defining the rights of recipients. Justice Marshall once observed
that in focusing on a particular provision of the AFDC program "in
order to determine its role in the statutory scheme, something of
'" See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
11 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
'19 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 396, 398.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
1 RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
122 RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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the general flavor of the overall legislation is undoubtedly lost."12
That "flavor," according to Marshall, "is to assist needy families to
maintain strong family bonds and to assist needy individuals to
realize their potential as unique human beings by providing them
with the basic necessities of life, along with incentives and training
to encourage them to work to help themselves. 1
24
Although the OBRA amendments reduced the work incentives
built into the AFDC program, they were not intended to eliminate
these incentives altogether. Construing the work expense disregard
to apply to mandatory payroll deductions is based upon an obso-
lete regulation and is inconsistent with both the availability and
work incentive policies of the Social Security Act. In order to en-
courage AFDC recipients to "work to help themselves," mandatory
payroll deductions should be disregarded from income. They
should be disregarded, however, not as part of the section 402(a)(8)
work expense disregard, but because they are not available income
under section 402(a)(7).
Amy Klobuchar
,S Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 574 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124 Id.
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